Publications

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Kriegel, U. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.

Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).