Publications

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Casati, R. & Tonello, F. (2018). Voto elettronico e partecipazione democratica. Web e società democratica (pp. 3-15). Turin: Accademia University Press

Casati, R. (2018). Shadows, objects and the lexicon: On some lexicalized and non-lexicalized concepts of shadow and light. In C. Mac Cumhaill, Thomas Crowther (Eds.), Perceptual Ephemera Oxford: OUP. doi:10.1080/13875868.2017.1377204

Casati, R. (2017). Two, then Four Modes of functioning of the mind: towards an unification of “dual” theories of reasoning and theories of cognitive artifacts. In J. M. Zacks, H. A. Taylor (Eds.), Representations in Mind and World. Essays inspired by Barbara Tversky (pp. 7-23). New York: Routledge

Casati, R. (2002). What the Internet Tells Us about the Real Nature of the Book. In .

Casati, R. (1995). Temporal entities in space. In .

Casati, R. (2013). Knowledge of knots: shapes in action. In , 3-20.

Chierchia, G., Fox, D. & Spector, B. (2009). Hurford's constraint and the theory of scalar implicatures. Presuppositions and implicatures (Vol. 60, pp. 47–62).MIT Working Papers in Linguistics

Chierchia, G., Fox , F. & Spector, B. (2012). Scalar implicature as a grammatical phenomenon. In Maienborn, Claudia and Klaus von Heusinger and Paul Portner (Eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning (Vol. 3).Walter de Gruyter . doi:10.1515/9783110253382.2297

Chiril, P. , Moriceau, V. , Benamara, F. , Origgi, G., Coulomb-Gully, M. & Mari, A. (2020). He said “who’s gonna take care of your children when you are at ACL?”: Reported Sexist Acts are Not Sexist. In 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 2020, France, 4055-4066. doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.373

Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D. & Van Rooij, R. (2015). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. Unifying the philosophy of truth (pp. 409–430).

De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS

de Vignemont, F. (2021). Feeling the world as being here. In F. de Vignemont, A. Serino, H.Y. Wong, A. Farnè (Eds.), The world at our fingertips: A multidisciplinary investigation of peripersonal space, Oxford : Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

de Vignemont, F. (2017). Can I see your pain? An evaluativist model of pain perception. In Jennifer Corns, Routledge (Eds.), Routledge handbook of philosophy of pain

de Vignemont, F. (2015). Bodily awareness.

de Vignemont, F. & Massin, O. (2015). Touch. In M. Matthen (Eds.), Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2014). Acting for bodily awareness. In L. Shapiro. Routledge (Eds.), Routledge handbook of embodied cognition (pp. 287-295).

de Vignemont, F. (2010). Knowing other people’s mental states as if they were one’s own. In D. Schmicking and S. Gallagher (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (pp. 283-299).Springer

de Vignemont, F. (2006). Le cerveau. Dictionnaire du corps (pp. 173-177).Presses Universitaires de France

de Vignemont, F. (2017). Agency and bodily ownership: The Bodyguard hypothesis. In F. de Vignemont and A. Alsmith (Eds.), The subject’s matterThe MIT Press