Publications

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Chevallier, C. (2019). Theory of mind and autism: Revisiting Baron-Cohen et al.’s Sally-Anne study. In A. Slater and P. Quinn (Eds.), Developmental Psychology: Revisiting the Classic Studies 2nd edition (pp. 148-163).Sage

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chevallier, C. (2021). Vivre dans un environnement risqué : quels impacts pour la psychologie ? In Claudia Senik (Eds.), Sociétés en danger (Odile Jacob ed., pp. 197 à 208). Paris: La Découverte. doi:10.3917/dec.senik.2021.01.0197

Lussange, J., Belianin, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Gutkin, B. (2021). Learning and Cognition in Financial Markets: A Paradigm Shift for Agent-Based Models. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Vol. 1252, pp. 241-255). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-55190-2_19