Publications

Schlenker, P. (2002). Conditionals as Definite Descriptions (A Referential Analysis) Journal of Language & Computation, 2(3), 417-462. doi:10.1007/s11168-004-0908-2

Bouvier, A. (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1 ), 51–70

Bouvier, A. (2002). Dans quelle mesure la théorie sociale de James Coleman est-elle trop parcimonieuse?

Nicolas, D. (2002). La distinction entre noms massifs et noms comptables. Leuven: Editions Peeters

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Proust, J. (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Philosophical Psychology , 15(4), 543–550

Pacherie, E. (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy , 2(3), 299–317

Pacherie, E. (2002). Emotion and Action. European Review of Philosophy, 5, 55-90

Pacherie, E. (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy , 5, 53–92

Casati, R. (2002). The Unity of the Kind "Artwork" www.interdisciplines.org

Casati, R. & Varzi, A. (2002). Un altro mondo? [Another world? - in Italian] Rivista di Estetica

Schlenker, P. (2002). A Plea for Monsters . Linguistics and Philosophy, 26(1), 29–120. doi:10.1023/A:1022225203544

Fourneret, P., de Vignemont, F., Franck, N., Slachevsky, A., Dubois, B. & Jeannerod , M. (2002). Perception of self-generated action in schizophrenia. Cognitive neuropsychiatry, 7(2), 139-56. doi:10.1080/13546800143000212

Nicolas, D. & Lefeuvre, F. (2003). La phrase averbale existentielle et la distinction aspectuelle télique / atélique. Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique, 14, 157-168

Justo, D., Dutant, J., Hardy-Vallée, B., Nicolas, D. & Sylvand, B. (2003). Delegation, subdivision, and modularity: How rich is Conceptual Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(6), 683-684. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03390156

Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4 ), 495–509

Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue, 447-480

Casati, R. (2003). The availability of large size from shadow: looking for hidden assumptions. Perception

Casati, R. (2003). Representational Advantages. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 281-298

Casati, R. (2003). The Unity of the Kind Artwork. Rivista di Estetica, 23(43), 3-31

Casati, R. (2003). Methodological issues in the study of the depiction of cast shadows. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Schlenker, P. (2003). Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem) Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 21, 157-214. doi:10.1023/A:1021843427276

Bouvier, A. (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34(3), 382–407. doi:10.1177/0048393103260772

Bouvier, A. (2004). Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Société Libre? Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Citoyenneté Libératrice? Ce Qui Reste de l'Horizon Marxiste - En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Nor. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102(2), 311–332

Bouvier, A. (2004). En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Normative Et de l'Éthique Sociale. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102 (2), 311–332

Spector, B. (2004). Indefinites in subject position are positive polarity items. Snippets, 9, 13–14

Pacherie, E. (2004). Looking for the Agent in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 2, 54–55.

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Experience, Belief and the Interpretive Fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 81-86

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions . Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11(1), 1–11

Jeannerod , M. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language, 19(2), 113–146