Publications

Pacherie, E. (2001). Agency Lost and Found: A Commentary on Spence. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8(2), 173–176

Pacherie, E. (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy , 2(3), 299–317

Pacherie, E. (2002). Emotion and Action. European Review of Philosophy, 5, 55-90

Pacherie, E. (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy , 5, 53–92

Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue, 447-480

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Experience, Belief and the Interpretive Fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 81-86

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions . Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11(1), 1–11

Jeannerod , M. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language, 19(2), 113–146

J. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language , 20(2), 163–88

Stojanovic, I. (2005). A Different Story about Indexicals. , Amsterdam: ILLC Research Reports

Pacherie, E. & Dokic, J. (2006). From mirror neurons to joint actions. Journal of Cognitive Systems Research,, 7, 101-112. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.012

Pacherie, E., Green, M. & Bayne, T. (2006). Phenomenology and delusions: who put the 'alien' in alien control? Consciousness and cognition, 15(3), 566-77. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008

Pacherie, E. & Bayne, T. (2007). Narrators and comparators: The architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese, 159, 3, 475-491. doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9239-9

Pacherie, E. (2007). The anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior: a window onto agentive self-awareness. Functional neurology, 22(4), 211-7.

Pacherie, E. (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 13, 1–30

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2007). Too much ado about beliefs. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(1-2), 185-200. doi:10.1007/s11097-006-9036-9

Stojanovic, I. (2007). Talking about Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments and Relative Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 691-706. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9030-5

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework. Cognition, 107(1), 179-217. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003

Stojanovic, I. (2008). The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction . Synthese, 165(3), 317–319

Grèzes, J., Wicker, B., Berthoz, S. & De Gelder, B. (2009). A failure to grasp the affective meaning of actions in autism spectrum disorder subjects. Neuropsychologia, 47(8-9). doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.02.021

Stojanovic, I. (2009). When Truth Gives Out, by Mark Richard . Disputatio, 27, 150-158

Stojanovic, I. (2009). Semantic Content. Manuscrito, 32 (1), 123–152

Van Den Stock, J., Peretz, I., Grèzes, J. & De Gelder, B. (2009). Instrumental music influences recognition of emotional body language. Brain topography, 21(3-4), 216-20. doi:10.1007/s10548-009-0099-0

Pichon, S., De Gelder, B. & Grèzes, J. (2009). Two different faces of threat. Comparing the neural systems for recognizing fear and anger in dynamic body expressions. NeuroImage, 47(4), 1873-83. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.03.084

Van De Riet, W., Grèzes, J. & De Gelder, B. (2009). Specific and common brain regions involved in the perception of faces and bodies and the representation of their emotional expressions. Social neuroscience, 4(2), 101-20. doi:10.1080/17470910701865367

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2010). Regret and the rationality of choices. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 365(1538), 249-57. doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0163

Recanati, F., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva, N. (2010). Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity.

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Context, Meaning and Logical Truth. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Special Issue on Logic and Philosophy Today, 2(27), 13-26

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28