Publications

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Kriegel, U. (2017). Introduction. In Uriak Kriegel (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (pp. 1-11). London and New York: Routledge

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan

Kriegel, U. (2017). Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect. In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (Eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social SignificanceRowman & Littlefield

Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .

Kriegel, U. (2017). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun. (pp. 7–46).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Philosophical Program. (pp. 21–32 ).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano on Judgment. (pp. 103–109).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena. (pp. 97–102).

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2020). Bounded reason in a social world. In Ricardo Viale (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality

Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press

Ramus, F., Peperkamp, S., Christophe, A., Jacquemot, C., Kouider, S. & Dupoux, E. (2010). A Psycholinguistic Perspective on the Acquisition of Phonology. In C. Fougeron (Eds.), Laboratory Phonology (Vol. 10 ).De Gruyter Mouton

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Recanati, F. (2017). About the lekton. Response to Max Kölbel. In I. Depraetere et R. Salkie (Eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line (pp. 215-224). Berlin: Springer

Recanati, F. (2017). Cognitive Dynamics: A New Look at an Old Problem. In M. de Ponte et K. Korta (Eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language Oxford: Oxford University Press