Publications

de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Giannakidou, A. & Mari, A. (2017). La dimension épistémique du futur : le rôle des adverbes. In Baranzini and de Saussures (Eds.), Le Futur dans les langues RomanesPeter Lang Ag

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2020). Bounded reason in a social world. In Ricardo Viale (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality

Mercier, H. (2021). Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust And What We Believe.

Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University

Nicolas, D. (2006). Massif / comptable. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Compositionalité: questions philosophiques. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Ambiguïté. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2005). Types of degrees and types of event structures. Event arguments: foundations and applications (pp. 277-300).

Nicolas, D. (2002). La catégorisation des noms communs : massifs et comptables. Catégorisation et Langage (pp. 29-51).

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Langage, discours, pensée. Collège de France

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Recanati, F. (2017). About the lekton. Response to Max Kölbel. In I. Depraetere et R. Salkie (Eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line (pp. 215-224). Berlin: Springer

Recanati, F. (2017). Cognitive Dynamics: A New Look at an Old Problem. In M. de Ponte et K. Korta (Eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language Oxford: Oxford University Press

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP