Publications

Pacherie, E. (2011). Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control. Social psychology, 42(1), 67-73. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000044

Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(2), 173-192

Pacherie, E. (2002). Emotion and Action. European Review of Philosophy, 5, 55-90

Pacherie, E. (2007). The anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior: a window onto agentive self-awareness. Functional neurology, 22(4), 211-7.

Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework. Cognition, 107(1), 179-217. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003

Pacherie, E., Green, M. & Bayne, T. (2006). Phenomenology and delusions: who put the 'alien' in alien control? Consciousness and cognition, 15(3), 566-77. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008

Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue, 447-480

Pacherie, E. (2013). How does it feel to act together? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-21. doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9329-8

Pacherie, E. (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy , 5, 53–92

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 13, 1–30

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Pacherie, E. (2014). Can Conscious Agency Be Saved? Topoi, 33(1), 33–45

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Passions Sociales. Paris: PUF

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Origgi, G. (2018). https://www.openaire.eu.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Politicamente corretto. Genesi, sviluppi e derive di un’ideologia Americana. Micromega

Origgi, G. (2018). La democrazia può sopravvivere a Facebook? Egualitarismo epistemico, vulnerabilità cognitiva e nuove tecnologie. Ragion pratica, 445-458. doi:10.1415/91549

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Nioche, A., Rougier, N., Deffains, M., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., Ballesta, S. & Boraud, T. (2021). The adaptive value of probability distortion and risk-seeking in macaques' decision-making. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 376(1819), 20190668. doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0668

Nioche, A., Garcia, B., Lefebvre, G., Boraud, T., Rougier, N. & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2019). Coordination over a unique medium of exchange under information scarcity. Palgrave Communications, 5, 153. doi:10.1057/s41599-019-0362-2

Nioche, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Boraud, T. (2019). An asymmetry of treatment between lotteries involving gains and losses in rhesus monkeys. Scientific Reports, 9(10441). doi:10.1038/s41598-019-46975-2