Publications

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

Terrone, E. (2017). On Time in Cinema. In Ian Phillips (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Temporal Experience (pp. 326-338). New York: Routledge

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP

Egré, P. (2018). Qu'est-ce que le vague? Vrin - Chemins Philosophiques

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Asic, T. & Corblin, F. (2014). Telic definties and their prepositions. French and Serbian. In Aguilar-Guevara, Ana, Bert Le Bruyn and Joost Zwarts (Eds.), Weak Referentiality (pp. 183-212).Benjamins

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University