Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Nicolas, D. (2005). Types of degrees and types of event structures. Event arguments: foundations and applications (pp. 277-300).

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Nicolas, D. (2004). The semantics of nouns derived from gradable adjectives. In Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 8, 197-207.

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Asic, T. & Corblin, F. (2014). Telic definties and their prepositions. French and Serbian. In Aguilar-Guevara, Ana, Bert Le Bruyn and Joost Zwarts (Eds.), Weak Referentiality (pp. 183-212).Benjamins

Stojanovic, I. (2011). Talking about the Future: Unsettled Truth and Assertion. In Korta, Kepa and Maria Ponte (Eds.), In Proceedings of SPR-11: Semantics, Pragmatics, Rhetoric. Donostia: ILCLI Publications.

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part II) In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Hannover.

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part I) , Vol. 49: In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences , Hannover.

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.