Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Egré, P. (2018). Qu'est-ce que le vague? Vrin - Chemins Philosophiques

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).