How Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ In Epistemology ?
The ’ought implies can’ principle in epistemology holds that if one cannot be in doxastic state D, then one is not epistemically required to be in D. This generates a puzzle. On the one hand, something like this principle must be true, since we’re not rationally required to think like supercomputers. But on the other hand, it also seems to imply that any belief is rationally permissible, no matter how epistemically egregious, just so long as the believer can’t do any better — and surely that can’t be right.



Ce séminaire d’élèves transdisciplinaire est soutenu par 8 départements de l’ENS : les départements de Géographie, d’Histoire, de Philosophie, de Sciences sociales, d’Économie, d’Études cognitives, ainsi que par le CERES et ECLA.